We introduce …rm and worker heterogeneity into a model of innovation-driven endogenous growth. Individuals who di¤er in ability sort into either a research sector or a manufacturing sector that produces di¤erentiated goods. Each research project generates a new variety of the di¤erentiated product and a random technology for producing it. Technologies di¤er in complexity and productivity, and technological sophistication is complementary to worker ability. We study the co-determination of growth and income inequality in both the closed and open economy, as well as the spillover e¤ects of policy and conditions in one country to outcomes in others.
Introduction
The relationship between growth and inequality has been much studied and much debated. Scholars have advanced a number of hypotheses linking growth to inequality, with causation running in one direction or the other. Yet attempts to substantiate the proposed mechanisms and to measure their empirical relevance have been stymied by inadequate data and methodological pitfalls. Kuznets (1955, 1963) , for example, famously advanced the hypothesis that income inequality …rst rises then falls over the course of economic development. While the "Kuznets curve"-an inverted-U shaped relationship between inequality and stage of development-has been established for the small set of countries that Kuznets considered, subsequent studies using broader data sets cast doubt on the ubiquity of this relationship. 1 Inequality might a¤ect growth via several channels, such as if rich and poor households di¤er in their propensity to save (Kaldor, 1955-56) , if poor households face credit constraints that limit their ability to invest in human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993) , or if greater inequality generates more redistribution and thus a di¤erent incentive structure via the political process (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 ; Persson and Tabellini, 1994) . While all of these mechanisms are plausible, quantitative assessment has proven elusive due to the fact that a country's growth rates and income inequality are jointly determined. A similar problem has plagued attempts to assess the relationship between trade and growth (see Helpman, 2004, ch.6 ).
The historical record shows rising inequality in the distribution of personal income in the world economy from the early part of the 19th century-when growth accelerated after the industrial revolution-until well into the 20th century. The evolution of income inequality during this period re ‡ects trends in within-country inequality and trends in between-country inequality. Table 1 , drawn from Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) and Morrisson and Murtin (2011a) , provides a decomposition of these long-run trends, using the Theil Index as a measure of per capita income inequality. 2 The table shows that between-country inequality has risen over time throughout the course of almost two centuries, while the time path for within-country inequality has been more uneven. Such inequality rose steadily between 1820 and World War I, declined through the Great Depression and into the 1970's, and rose again subsequently. 3 During the same period, growth in world per capita income accelerated until World War I, declined between the two world wars, and accelerated again after World War II, up until the oil crisis of 1973 (see Maddison, 2001) . The …rst and second waves of globalization roughly correspond with the periods of rapid growth. It appears 1 See Helpman (2004, ch.4 ) for a survey of this evidence. 2 The normalized Theil Index I for a set of income levels fyig; i = 1; : : : ; N , is de…ned by
where y is the mean of y. It ranges from zero, when all incomes are the same, to one, when one individual enjoys all of the aggregate income. 3 Sala-i-Martin (2006) reports further increases in within-country inequality as measured by the Theil Index for the period from 1992 to 2000, but declining between-country inequality, mostly due to rapid growth in China and India. that at a broad, historical level, trade, growth and inequality have been positively correlated.
In more recent data, a link between growth and income inequality can be seen in a cross section of countries using the data reported by Morrisson and Murtin (2011b) . They tabulate the Gini coe¢ cients of disposable income for 35 countries at varying stages of development, for a pair of years chosen based on data availability. Typically, the …rst observation for each country is for a year in the early 1990's and the second is for a year in the mid-2000's. As well, they report real GDP per inhabitant in 1992 and in 2008. In Figure 1 , we plot the annual growth rate in per capita income against the percentage change in the Gini coe¢ cient per annum for these 35 countries. The positive correlation between the two measures is quite apparent.
The aim of this paper is to explore theoretically the relationship between long-run growth and income inequality and to understand the role that international integration plays in mediating this relationship. 4 To this end, we introduce worker and …rm heterogeneity into a familiar model of endogenous growth à la Romer (1990) . Here, the accumulation of knowledge serves as the engine of growth and is itself a by-product of purposive innovation undertaken to develop new products.
Our model of trade, international knowledge di¤usion, and growth extends the simplest, one-sector model from Grossman and Helpman (1991) . 5 The advantage of the framework we develop here is that it allows us to consider the entire distribution of earnings that emanates from a given distribution of worker abilities and …rm productivity levels, and not just, say, the skill premium (i.e., the relative wage of "skilled" versus "unskilled" workers), which has been the focus of much of the existing theoretical literature.
Our analysis provides potential explanations for cross-di¤erences in wage distributions and generates predictions about how technology and policy changes will a¤ect wages at di¤erent points in the distribution and measures of aggregate income inequality. 6 Our interest in the entirety of the wage distribution re ‡ects our understanding that distributions vary considerably across countries and over time. Take, for example, Table 2 , which displays the ratio of the …fth decile of men's earnings to the bottom decile of earnings and the ratio of the ninth decile of men's earnings to the …fth decile of earnings for two di¤erent years and ten di¤erent OECD countries. 7 In the …rst column of the table, we see that middle-income male earners fared much better in the United States compared to the bottom-tier workers than did their counterparts in France, yet the earnings of this group compared to the top-decile workers was about the same. The distribution in Canada was notably di¤erent from that in France, with a high ratio of …fth decile relative to …rst decile wages, but a more modest ratio of ninth decile wages relative to …fth decile.
The table shows as well that countries have experienced di¤erent changes over time. In some, like Ireland, Japan and Norway, wage inequality seems to have increased at both the bottom of the distribution (increase in the earnings of the …fth decile relative to the …rst decile) and at the top (increase in the earnings of the ninth decile relative to the …fth decile). In Canada and the United Kingdom, there was little change at the bottom end but a notable increase in equality at the top, whereas the pattern was just the opposite in Germany. Finally, in France, inequality declined modestly at both ends of the distribution.
Data on the U.S. income distribution are available for a longer span of time. Kopczuk et al.
(2010) use social security records to establish U-shaped patterns for the evolution from 1939 to 2004 of the ratio of the 80th to 50th percentile male earner and the ratio of the 50th to 20th paths. As such, we will not be able to speak directly to the data illustrated in Figure 1 , which arguably related to transition paths in most of the countries in the sample. 5 In Grossman and Helpman (1991) , we devote several chapters to models with two or more industrial sectors in order to address the impact of intersectoral resource allocation on growth and relative factor prices. By considering here a model with one industrial sector, we neglect this important, additional channel for trade to in ‡uence growth and income distribution. 6 Note, however, that our framework does not include a role for "superstars"and so is ill-suited to speak to evidence such as that emphasized by Atkinson et al. (2011) that income shares have been growing dramatically of late at the very top end of the distribution. 7 We focus on men's earnings, because we have nothing to say about the substantial cross-country di¤erences in female labor-market participation rates. We report observations for 2000 and 2007, because the former are the earliest available in the OECD data set and the latter are the latest that do not re ‡ect the impact of the …nancial crisis and resulting Great Recession. percentile male earner (see Figure 2 ). Both ratios fell until the early-to-mid 1950's and generally rose after 1970. However, the 1960s and 1990s were periods of a declining relative wage for the median male earner compared to both the 80th and 20th percentile earner; Autor (2010) refers to the latter period as one of "hollowing out of the middle class."While the intention of this paper is not to o¤er explanations for the observed di¤erences across space and across time, the variation in outcomes and experiences do motivate our interest in the determinants of the earnings pro…le. We shall see that our model can generate diverse patterns across countries and provides a link between income distribution and the economy's structural and policy features.
In the next section, we develop our model in the context of a closed economy. A country is populated by heterogeneous individuals who di¤er in ability. The economy produces a single consumption good with di¤erentiated intermediate inputs. Blueprints for the intermediate goods are the result of prior innovation e¤orts and are held by …rms that engage in monopolistic competition.
These …rms have access to di¤erent technologies and can hire workers of any ability. A …rm's total output is the sum of the outputs of its various employees and the productivity of any employee depends on his ability and on the …rm's technology. Moreover, ability and technology are complementary, so that more able workers are especially productive when they apply more sophisticated technologies. In equilibrium, the …rms with access to the better technologies hire the more able workers.
Innovation drives growth. Firms invest in R&D by hiring individuals to serve as inventors.
An inventor develops new varieties at a rate that depends on his own ability and the stock of knowledge capital available in the economy. Knowledge accumulates with R&D experience and is non-proprietary, as in Romer (1990) . When an inventor develops a new variety, the invention generates for the …rm a draw from a distribution of technologies. Thus, returns to investment in R&D are random and higher for …rms that are lucky enough to draw good (sophisticated)
technologies than for …rms that draw less good (simple) technologies. There is free entry into R&D, so at every moment with positive innovation, the momentary cost of a new variety in light of the state of knowledge matches the expected present discounted value of pro…ts that will result from the random technology draw.
Since …rms make zero expected returns and …rm ownership is shared widely, the (pre-tax) income distribution is determined in the competitive labor market. In Section 3, we compare growth rates and income inequality across countries that di¤er in their technological parameters and policy choices. In this section, we focus on isolated countries that do not trade and do not bene…t from any knowledge spillovers from abroad. We …nd, for example, that Hicks-neutral di¤erences in labor productivity in manufacturing that apply across the full range of ability levels do not generate long-run di¤erences in growth rates or income inequality, although they do imply di¤erences in income and consumption levels. In contrast, di¤erences in "innovation capacity" do generate di¤erences in growth and inequality. Innovation capacity is the product of a parameter that measures the size of a country's labor force, a parameter that re ‡ects its ability to convert research experience into knowledge capital, and a parameter that re ‡ects inventor's productivity in R&D. A country with greater innovation capacity grows faster in autarky but experiences greater income inequality. Subsidies to R&D …nanced by proportional wage taxes also contribute to faster growth but greater inequality. Finally, we compare countries that di¤er in the set of production technologies from which their successful innovators draw. We show that better technology draws can generate an income distribution with higher relative wages in the middle relative to both extremes. converge in the long-run. 9 Di¤erences in support for R&D do give rise to long-run di¤erences in wage inequality, as a higher subsidy goes hand in hand with a greater spread in wages. Also, if inventors in di¤erent countries draw from di¤erent technology sets, their income distributions will di¤er in the long run. We identify conditions under which a country that draws from a better set of technologies has greater inequality at the lower end of the income distribution, but similar or less inequality at the upper end. In Section 4, we also examine how various policy and parameter changes a¤ect long-run growth and inequality measures in the open economy both at home and abroad. For example, we show that an increase in the R&D subsidy rate in any country accelerates growth and raises inequality in all of them, as does an improvement in a country's ability to absorb knowledge spillovers from abroad.
Section 5 concludes and an appendix contains supporting technical details.
The Basic Model
In this section, we develop a model of economic growth featuring heterogeneous workers and heterogeneous …rms. In the model, endogenous innovation drives growth. Workers, who di¤er in ability, engage either in R&D or in manufacturing. Research generates new varieties of di¤erentiated intermediate inputs. Firms that produce these inputs operate di¤erent technologies. In the equilibrium, the heterogeneous workers sort into one of the two activities and …rms with di¤erent technologies hire di¤erent types of workers. The economy converges to a long-run equilibrium with a constant growth rate of …nal output and a …xed and continuous distribution of income.
We describe here the economic environment for a closed economy and defer the introduction of international trade until Section 4.
Demand and Supply for Consumption Goods
The economy is populated by a mass N of individuals indexed by ability level, a. The cumulative distribution of abilities is given by H (a), which is twice continuously di¤erentiable and has a positive density H 0 (a) > 0 on the bounded support, [a min ; a max ].
Each individual maximizes a logarithmic utility function
where c is consumption at time and is the common, subjective discount rate. The consumption good serves as numeraire; its price at every moment is normalized to one. It follows from the individual's intertemporal optimization problem that
where t is the interest rate at time t in terms of consumption goods. Inasmuch as a varies across individuals, so does income and consumption.
Consumption goods are assembled from an evolving set t of di¤erentiated intermediate inputs.
Dropping the time subscript for notational convenience, the production function for these goods at a moment when the set of available inputs is is given by
where x (!) is the input of variety !. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs is
constant and equal to .
The market for consumption goods is competitive. It follows that the equilibrium price of these goods re ‡ects the minimum unit cost of producing them. Since X is the numeraire, we have
where p (!) is the price of intermediate input !.
Supply, Demand, Pricing, and Pro…ts of Intermediate Goods
Once an intermediate good has been invented, it is produced by monopolistically-competitive …rms using labor as the sole input. Firms that manufacture these goods are distinguished by their technology, '. A …rm with a higher ' is more productive, no matter what type(s) of workers it hires. Consider a …rm that produces variety ! using technology ' and that hires a set L ! of workers types with densities`! (a). In such circumstances, the …rm's output is
where ('; a) is the productivity of workers of type a when applying technology '. Notice that productivity (given ') is independent of !.
We suppose that more productive technologies are also more complex and that more able workers have a comparative advantage in operating the more complex technologies. In other words, we posit a complementarity between the type of technology ' and the type of worker a in determining labor productivity. Formally, we adopt Assumption 1 The productivity function ('; a) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly log supermodular.
Assumption 1 implies 'a > 0 for all ' and a.
As is known from Costinot (2009), Eeckhout and Kircher (2013), Sampson (2013) and elsewhere, the strict log supermodularity of ( ) implies that, for a generic wage schedule w (a), each manufacturing …rm hires a single type of labor that is most appropriate given its technology ', and there is positive assortative matching (PAM) between …rm types and worker types. We denote by m (') the ability of workers employed by all …rms that produce a variety of intermediate by operating a technology '; PAM is revealed in the fact that m 0 (') > 0.
Shephard's lemma gives the demand for any variety ! as a function of the prices of all available intermediate goods, namely
In view of (4), demand for variety ! can be expressed as
Each …rm takes aggregate output of …nal goods X as given and so it perceives a constant elasticity of demand, . As is usual in such settings, the pro…t-maximizing …rm applies a …xed percentage markup to its unit cost.
Considering the optimal hiring decision, a …rm that operates a technology ' has productivity ['; m (')] and pays a wage w [m (')]. Hence, the …rm faces a minimal unit cost of
The …rm's pro…t-maximizing price is given by 10
This yields an operating pro…t of is an increasing function that captures how worker ability translates into R&D productivity. In equilibrium, the set L R of worker types performs the research function, with density`R (a). Then growth in the measure of varieties is given by
Inventing New Varieties
where g M = _ M =M .
Each invention generates a technology for producing a new variety. As in Melitz (2003) , we assume that entrepreneurs learn their technology only after the good is invented. Beforehand, they perceive that ' will be drawn from a cumulative distribution function G (') that is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable on the bounded support [' min ; ' max ].
Entrepreneurs can enter freely into R&D. Entry at time t generates a draw from the technology distribution G (') and then a stream of operating pro…ts, (') for t. On a balanced-growth path, wages of all types of workers grow at the common rate g w and …nal output grows at a constant rate g X . Final output serves only consumption, so, by (2) , g X = .
Operating pro…ts also grow at a constant rate g , independent of ', and, by (8) , g = g X
( 1) g w . Finally, (4) and (7) imply that, in a steady state, ( 1) g w = g M . Combining these long-run relationships, the expected discounted pro…ts for a new entrant at time t can be written as
With free entry, this must equal the cost of developing a new variety, w (a) =T (a) K M t for any a 2 L R . We again drop the time subscript and write the steady-state free-entry condition as
Sorting, Matching, and Labor-Market Equilibrium
Individuals gain employment in either research or manufacturing. We assume that high-ability
individuals enjoy a comparative advantage in R&D. In particular, we adopt
As we shall see in a moment, this assumption su¢ ces to ensure that, in an equilibrium with positive growth, all of the best workers with a greater than some a R engage in R&D, while the remaining workers with a less than a R manufacture intermediate goods.
Consider the competitive wages paid to any set of workers employed in the manufacturing sector.
In equilibrium, these wages must be such that the …rm with productivity ' is willing to hire the worker with ability m (') and does not prefer to hire instead a di¤erent worker. In other words, the wage function must be such that pro…ts are maximized for a …rm of type ' when it chooses the worker of type m ('). From the …rst-order condition for cost minimization, we have 11
Lemma 1 Consider any closed interval of workers [a 0 ; a 00 ] that is employed in the manufacturing sector in equilibrium. In the interior of this interval, the wage schedule must satisfy
for all a 2 a 0 ; a 00 ;
where m 1 ( ) is the inverse of m ( ).
Similarly, the entrepreneurs engaged in R&D must be willing to hire all of the workers employed there. Potential entrepreneurs are homogeneous, so full employment requires that wages rise with productivity in research, i.e.,
Lemma 2
Consider any closed interval of workers [a 0 ; a 00 ] that is employed in the R&D sector in equilibrium. In the interior of this interval, the wage schedule must satisfy
for all a 2 a 0 ; a 00 :
To secure full employment at all ability levels, the wage function must be continuous on [a min ; a max ].
Now suppose that an ability level a R is a "cuto¤" point such that an interval of workers with abilities just below a R works in one sector (i.e., manufacturing or R&D) while an interval of workers with abilities just above a R works in the other. First note that the wage schedule w (a) must be continuous at any such a R ; otherwise a …rm that hires individuals with ability just above a R could save discretely by hiring slightly less able workers while sacri…cing only marginally in the productivity of its workforce. Next, suppose that the workers with abilities in an interval [a 0 ; a R ) are employed in R&D whereas those with abilities in the interval (a R ; a 00 ] are employed in manufacturing, for some a 0 < a R < a 00 . Considering the shape of the wage schedule dictated by Lemma 1, if Assumption 2 is satis…ed, an entrepreneur could hire workers with ability slightly greater than a R to conduct research and would capture strictly positive expected pro…ts. 12 Of course, this is not possible in equilibrium, so the workers to the right of any cuto¤ point must in fact be employed in R&D, not in manufacturing. In short, we have Lemma 3 In any equilibrium with positive growth, all workers with type a 2 [a min ; a R ) are employed in the manufacturing sector and all workers with type a 2 (a R ; a max ] are employed in the R&D sector, for some a R 2 (a min ; a max ).
Now that we know which workers are employed in each sector, we can derive a di¤erential equation for the matching function in manufacturing by equating the supply of workers in some bottom interval of ability levels to the demand for workers by all …rms that hire these workers. We express this condition in terms of the wage bill paid and received by employees of all …rms with a 1 2 A …rm that hires the marginal researchers with ability aR to conduct R&D pays a cost cR(aR) per innovation, where cR (aR) = w (aR) = K M T (aR). If the …rm were instead to hire slightly better researchers, the proportional change in its cost per innovation would be
Since we have hypothesized that individuals with a 2 [aR; a 00 ] are employed in manufacturing, the wage pro…le in this range is guided by Lemma 1. Accordingly,
where the inequality follows directly from Assumption 2. technology index less than or equal to ', namely 13
Di¤erentiating this equation yields
We know from Grossman 
uniquely determine the matching function and the wage function for workers in manufacturing. 14 To emphasize the dependence of matching on the identity of the marginal worker, we will sometimes write the matching function as m ('; a R ). Note that matching depends on the properties of the labor productivity function ( ), the distribution functions of …rm and worker types G ( ) and
H ( ), and the elasticity of substitution , because these features of the economic environment enter the di¤erential equations. Matching does not depend directly on other parameters of the model, although these parameters can a¤ect matching indirectly, if they alter the cuto¤ a R . It is also clear that M X=N , which appears in (13) , has no a¤ect on matching; rather, changes in this measure of the size of the economy shift the wage function proportionately. This last point becomes particularly clear following di¤erentiation of (13) and the derivation of a second-order di¤erential equation for the matching function,
which is independent of M X=N , as are the boundary conditions. This second order di¤erential equation will prove useful in parts of the analysis below.
The solid curve in Figure 3 depicts the qualitative features of an equilibrium matching function for given a R . The least productive …rms, with technology parameter ' min ; employ the least able workers, with ability level a min . The most productive …rms, with technology parameter ' max ;
employ the manufacturing sector's most able workers, with ability level a R . Finally, the func- 1 3 By (5), (6) , and (7), a …rm with productivity employs
workers. Therefore, the left-hand side of (12) gives the aggregate wage bill paid by all …rms with technology parameter less than or equal to '. The right-hand side of (12) is the aggregate wage income of workers with ability less than or equal to m (') 1 4 For further discussion of uniqueness of this solution, see Appendix A2.4. (11) and (13) that apply for di¤erent boundary conditions can intersect at most once. 15 But since the curves must intersect at the common lower boundary point, they cannot intersect again. It follows that when the manufacturing expands by an increase in a R , every worker originally in the sector matches with a less productive …rm than before, while every …rm upgrades its workforce. This feature plays a key role in shaping wage inequality in manufacturing.
The Balanced-Growth Path
Equation (9) gives a relationship between the steady-state growth rate in the number of varieties and the set of resources allocated to R&D. Now that we know that the workforce in research comprises all workers with ability above a R and only those workers. So, we can rewrite the equation as
The curve RR in Figure 4 depicts this relationship between g M and a R . The curve-which falls entirely in the positive quadrant-shows that faster growth in the number of varieties requires greater resources devoted to R&D and therefore a lower cuto¤ ability level for the marginal research worker.
We can derive a second long-run relationship between g M and a R using the labor-market clearing condition (12) and the long-run free entry condition, (10) . First note that, given the ability cuto¤ a R and the matching function m ('; a R ), the wage equation (11) in Lemma 1 allows us to compute 
where (a; a R ) w (a) =w(a min ). We emphasize, with the notation for (a; a R ), that this ratio depends only on a R and the parameters that a¤ect the di¤erential equation (15) for the matching function. Using (17), along with (10), (12) and the continuity of the wage function at a R , we derive in Appendix A2.5 the following relationship between the long-run growth rate and the ability cuto¤:
where
The AA curve in Figure 4 illustrates this second relationship between g M and a R . The fact that it is everywhere upward sloping also is established in the appendix.
The …gure shows a unique balanced-growth equilibrium at point E. 16 Once we know the longrun rate of growth in the number of intermediate goods, we can calculate the growth in consumption and wages from g w = g c = g M = ( 1). 17 Once we know the steady-state cuto¤ level of ability a R , we can compute the long-run distribution of relative wages (and incomes) using the wage structures dictated by Lemmas 1 and 2. 1 6 If the AA curve falls below the horizontal axis for all aR amax, then no workers are employed in the research sector in the steady state. In such circumstances, growth rates of varieties, …nal output, consumption and wages are all zero. 1 7 Consumption grows in the long run at the rate of income, and wages are the sole source of income, because in the steady state the ‡ow of operating pro…ts just covers R&D costs.
Measuring Inequality
Before proceeding to analyze the determinants of long-run growth and income distribution in the closed economy, we conclude this section with a brief discussion about wage inequality and the size distribution of …rms. We shall focus on measures of wage inequality such as the Theil index, the Atkinson index and Lorenz-curve dominance that are scale invariant (i.e., they are homogeneous of degree zero in all wages) and that respect second-order stochastic dominance. When comparing two wage distributions, we will say that one is strictly more unequal than the other if an appropriate proportional scaling of the former yields a distribution that is a mean-preserving spread of the latter. More formally, we …rst describe inequality among a limited range of workers with abilities in the interval [a 0 ; a 00 ] [a min; a max ] : We propose De…nition 1 Let w (a) andw (a) be continuous and increasing wage functions. The distribution of w has strictly greater inequality than the distribution ofw on the interval [a 0 ; a 00 ] if there exists a scalar > 0 such that w (a) 6 =w (a) for some a 2 [a 0 ; a 00 ] and the conditional distribution of w is a mean-preserving spread of the conditional distribution ofw.
If the wages w (a) happen to be proportional to the wagesw (a) for all a 2 [a 0 ; a 00 ], we will say that the two distributions have equal inequality in the interval.
Next, we turn to the full wage distribution. We rank inequality in two di¤erent distributions as follows. To make comparisons of wage inequality both within and between countries, it will prove useful to rely on the single-crossing property of the mean-adjusted wage functions. That is, we shall apply The lemma follows immediately from the fact that the single-crossing property ensures that w (a) is a mean-preserving spread ofw (a). If we can establish a single-crossing property for mean-adjusted wage distributions, this su¢ ces to allow a ranking of the distributions in terms of their inequality.
We show next how wage inequality within the manufacturing sector re ‡ects the cuto¤ ability level, a R . We have seen already in (17) that the ratio of the wage of any worker in the manufacturing Figure 5 : Relative wages sector relative to that of the least-able worker is uniquely determined by a R . Moreover, Figure 3 has been used to illustrate that an increase in a R causes all workers originally in manufacturing to match with less productive …rms than before. The downgrade in technology harms the productivity of all of these workers, but-due to the complementarity between ability and technology-it especially harms those with relatively greater ability. In other words, we have 18
for all a 00 > a 0 and a 0 ; a 00 2 [a min ; a R ] .
Lemma 5 states that the relative-wage function ( ) is log submodular in the ability of a worker and the ability cuto¤ level. Intuitively, relative wages behave like relative productivities, and since the cuto¤ level a R inversely a¤ects the technology match for every worker, the function (a; a R ) inherits the opposite properties as (a; '). Note that since (a min ,a R ) = (a min ,a 0 R ) = 1, the lemma also implies that (a; a R ) > (a; a 0 R ) for all a 2 (a min ; a R ). In words, an increase in the cuto¤ level shifts the relative-wage function for manufacturing downward.
The solid curve in Figure 5 depicts the relative wage structure (in logs) for an economy in which the cuto¤ ability level is a R . To the left of a R , ln [w (a) =w (a min )] = ln (a; a R ), where ln (a; a R ) can be calculated using (17) . The curve rises with slope a m 1 (a; a R ) ; a = m 1 (a; a R ) ; a in this range. To the right of a R , ln [w (a) =w (a min )] = ln [T (a) (a R ; a R ) =T (a R )], and the curve rises with slope T 0 (a) =T (a). By Assumption 2, the wage schedule becomes steeper at the cuto¤ point, labelled 1. Now consider an increase in the cuto¤ point, to a 0 R > a R . In Figure 5 , the log of the new relative wage structure is depicted by the dotted curve. By Lemma 5, the dotted curve must be ‡atter than the solid curve for all ability levels a < a R . For a > a 0 R the slopes of the two curves are the same, namely T 0 (a) =T (a). Finally, Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that the dotted curve is ‡atter than the solid curve for all a 2 (a R ; a 0 R ). 19 These observations allow us to draw a number of conclusions about the relationship between the size of the manufacturing sector and wage inequality. First, when a R rises to a 0 R (i.e., employment in manufacturing grows at the expense of R&D), wage inequality falls among any range of workers Finally, we note that the rematching of workers to …rms that results from a change in the size and composition of the manufacturing sector has implications as well for the size distribution of …rms. When the matches deteriorate for workers, as they do when the cuto¤ point for employment in manufacturing rises from a R to a 0 R and the distribution of technologies G (') remains the same, the matches improve for the …rms that hire these workers. This rematching raises productivity for all …rms, but especially so for those with more sophisticated technologies (as indexed by '). Since the more productive …rms gain the most in terms of either sales or revenues, the size distribution of …rms widens. This gives us 20 1 9 Note that the slope of the solid curve in this range is T 0 (a) =T (a), whereas the slope of the dotted curve is w 0 (a; a 0 R ) =w (a; a 0 R ) = a (a; a 0 R ) = (a; a 0 R ) = a m 1 (a; a 0 R ) ; a = m 1 (a; a 0 R ) ; a , by the de…nition of the relativewage function ( ) and the wage equation (11) . Assumption 2 implies
for a < a 0 R .
2 0 Using the expression for`(') from footnote 13, the volume of output of a …rm with technology ' is
and, using (7) , its revenue is
Equation (11) then implies that
Lemma 7 Suppose a R ; a 0 R 2 [a min ; a max ] ; with a 0 R > a R . If the distribution of technologies G (') is the same, then the size distribution of …rm output and …rm revenue is more unequal whenthe cuto¤ ability level is a 0 R than when it is a R .
Lemma 7 implies that, as long as the distribution of technologies does not change, changes in the size distribution of …rms are opposite to changes in wage inequality among manufacturing workers.
We will not record all of the implications for the …rm size distribution below, but we note that they apply to all comparative statics except for those in Section 3.4 and 4.5.
Growth and Inequality in Autarky Equilibrium
In this section, we compare growth rates and inequality measures in a pair of closed economies.
We consider countries i and j that are basically similar but di¤er in some technological or policy parameters. We focus on balanced-growth equilibria as described in Section 2. In the next section, we will perform similar cross-country comparisons for a set of open economies and examine how the opening of trade a¤ects growth and inequality around the globe.
Productivity in Manufacturing
We begin by supposing that the countries di¤er only in their productivity in manufacturing, as In these circumstances, the matching function m ('; a R ) that satis…es (15) is common to both countries; i.e., a di¤erence between i and j does not a¤ect matching in the manufacturing sector for a given a R . Therefore, the relative-wage function (a; a R ) also will be the same in both countries if they have the same cuto¤ point, as can be seen clearly from (17) . But then the solution to (16) and (18) is the same for any values of i and j . In other words, countries that di¤er only in the (Hicks-neutral) productivity of their manufacturing sectors share the same long-run growth rate and the same marginal worker in manufacturing. It follows that their wage distributionsas re ‡ected by w (a; a R ) =w (a min ; a R )-are also the same for all a 2 [a min ; a max ]. Hicks-neutral di¤erences in manufacturing productivity do not generate long-run di¤erences in autarky growth rates or income distribution, although they do a¤ect income levels. We summarize in Proposition 1 Suppose that countries i and j di¤ er only in manufacturing labor productivity c ( ) and that these di¤ erences are Hicks-neutral; i.e., c ( ) = c ( ) for c = i; j. Then in autarky, and ln r (' 2 ) ln r (' 1 ) = ( 1)
It follows from Assumption 1 that ' = rises when m (') increases at all '.
both countries grow at the same rate in a balanced-growth equilibrium and both share the same structure of relative wages and the same degree of income inequality.
Capacity to Innovate
In our model, a country's capacity for innovation is described by three parameters: size, which determines the potential scale of the research activity; the productivity of research workers of a given ability level; and the e¢ ciency with which research experience is converted into knowledge capital. In this section, we compare autarky growth rates and income distributions in countries that di¤er in labor force, N c , in e¢ ciency of knowledge accumulation, Kc , and in the productivity of research workers, as captured by a Hicks-neutral shift parameter T c , where T c (a) = T c T (a).
The RR curve in Figure 4 is described by equation (16) . In this equation, the aforementioned parameters enter as a product; i.e., the right-hand side of the equation is proportional to Kc N c T c , for given a R and a common T (a) schedule. The same product also enters into equation (18) for the AA curve. Here, the relative-wage function (a; a R ) appears under the integral. However, none of the three parameters under consideration enters into the second-order di¤erential equation (15) that determines the the matching function for given a R , and therefore none a¤ects the relative wage function (a; a R ) for given a R . It follows that the right-hand side of (18) also is proportional to Kc N c T c , for given a R . In turn, this implies that Kc N c T c is a su¢ cient statistic for the innovation capacity in country c; variation in this product explains cross-country variation in (autarky) longrun growth rates and income distribution, all else the same. Now consider two countries i and j that di¤er in innovation capacity such that Ki N i T i > Kj N j T j . Under these circumstances, the AA and RR curves for country i lie above those for country j. But relative to the equilibrium cuto¤ point a Rj in country j, the AA curve in country i passes above the RR curve in that country. 21 It follows that the equilibrium point for country i lies above and to the left of that for country j; i.e., country i devotes more resources to R&D and grows faster in the long run.
What are the implications for the comparison of the two wage distributions? By Lemma 6,  we know that wages are more equally distributed in country j, where the range of ability levels allocated to manufacturing is larger. The faster growing country has a greater share of workers in R&D and thus a less able set of workers in its manufacturing sector compared to the slower growing country. As a result, each manufacturing worker in country i is paired with a better technology than his counterpart of similar ability in country j. This favors especially the more able manufacturing workers in country i, due to the complementarity between ability and technology. It follows that for any two ability levels employed in manufacturing in both countries, the relative wage of the more able in the pair is higher in country i than in country j. The allocation of a greater share of workers to research in country i compared to country j further contributes to its greater wage inequality, inasmuch as wages rise more rapidly with ability in the R&D sector than they do in manufacturing.
We summarize these …ndings in Proposition 2 Suppose that countries i and j di¤ er only in their capacity for innovation and that Ki N i T i > Kj N j T j . Then, in autarky, country i grows faster in a balanced-growth equilibrium than country j and it has everywhere a more unequal wage distribution.
Note that a country with a large population may have a low capacity for innovation, if its workers are not very productive in the research sector or if (for institutional or other reasons) it does not convert research experience into knowledge capital very e¢ ciently. But whatever the source of a country's innovation capacity, the larger is its capacity to conduct R&D the faster will be its long-run growth in autarky and the more unequal will be its distribution of earnings.
Support for R&D
Next we examine the role that research policy plays in shaping growth and inequality, focusing speci…cally on cross-country di¤erences in R&D subsidies. We consider symmetric countries i and j that di¤er only in their subsidy rates, s i and s j . In each country, the subsidy is …nanced by a proportional tax on wages. 22 With a subsidy in place, a research …rm in country c pays a cost (1 s c ) w c (a) =T (a) K M c to invent a new variety when it hires researchers with ability a.
Accordingly, the free-entry condition that gives rise to the AA curve in Figure 4 is replaced by
Neither equation (16) that relates growth to resources invested in R&D, nor the RR curve that depicts this relationship, is a¤ected by the subsidy.
It follows immediately that, if s i > s j , the AA curve for country i rests above and to the left of that for country j. Not surprisingly, the subsidy draws labor into the research sector and, thereby, stimulates growth. The link to the income distribution should also be clear by now. With a Ri < a Rj , the technology matches are better for manufacturing workers of a given ability in country i than in country j, which generates a more unequal distribution of wages. The larger size of the research sector in country i also contributes to its greater inequality, because ability is more amply rewarded in R&D than in manufacturing. In short, the country with the larger R&D subsidy experiences greater wage inequality. Proposition 3 Suppose that countries i and j di¤ er only in their R&D subsidies and that s i > s j . Then, in autarky, country i grows faster in a balanced-growth equilibrium than country j and it has everywhere a more unequal wage distribution. In Section 4.4, we will revisit the e¤ects of R&D subsidies for an open economy and will address the spillover e¤ects of such subsidies on growth and inequality in a country's trading partners. We will see that R&D subsidies increase inequality not only at home, but ubiquitously around the globe.
Manufacturing Technologies
Recall that an inventor draws a technology ' from a set of possible technologies for producing intermediate goods according to the distribution function G ( ). Countries may di¤er in the set of technologies that their inventors can access. To explore how such di¤erences a¤ect growth and inequality, we take G c (') to be a truncated Pareto distribution with domain [' min ; ' c ] for c = i; j and ' i > ' j . The countries otherwise are alike including in the "shapes" of their technology distributions. 23 Speci…cally, let
Here, k is the shape parameter, common to the two countries. With this formulation, the technological possibilities facing inventors in country i …rst-order stochastically dominate those facing inventors in country j. 24 Note that G 00 c (') =G 0 c (') is independent of c in the overlapping range of '. The other terms in the second-order di¤erential equation (15) for the matching function in country c are common in the two countries as well. It follows that di¤erences in matching between workers and technologies arise only because the boundary conditions (14) are di¤erent in the two countries, and not because the solutions for the matching functions take di¤erent forms. 25 To emphasize this point, we write the matching function for country c as m ('; a Rc ; ' c ) for c = i; j.
The inverse-matching functions for the two countries commence at the same point (a min ; ' min ), as depicted in Figure 6 . Since they can intersect only once, the (dotted) curve for country i would need to lie to the left of the (solid) curve for country j if the ranges of ability levels allocated to manufacturing in the two countries happened to be the same. In other words, m ('; a R ; ' i ) < m '; a R ; ' j for all ' 2 (' min ; ' j ]. This means that a worker of given ability would …nd a better technology match in country i than in country j if the ability of the marginal worker were the same, thanks to the fact that country i makes use of a strictly superior mix of technologies. In turn, this implies that (a; a R ; ' i ) > a; a R ; ' j for all a 2 (a min ; a R ]; the complementarity between ability and technology would give rise to a higher relative wage for a worker of any ability a > a min (compared to the wage of the least able worker) in the country with the better technology draws. For a similar reason, the relative wage of a worker of any ability a < a R compared to the wage of the worker with ability a R would be lower in country i than in country j if the cuto¤ ability levels were the same; i.e., (a; a R ;
This last observation implies that the AA curve for country i lies below that for country j. To see this, note the equation for the AA curve (18) and the fact that
It follows that (a R ; ' i ) < a R ; ' j . However, the RR curve is the same in the two countries inasmuch as the production technology set does not a¤ect the relationship between the labor allocated to R&D and the resulting growth rate of the number of varieties. We conclude that g M i < g M j and that a Ri > a Rj . Intuitively, we …nd that among two countries that are otherwise similar, the one that draws from a better set of technologies for producing intermediate goods devotes more resources to manufacturing and less to innovation. Now we are ready to compare the equilibrium wage distributions in the two countries. There are two o¤setting forces. On the one hand, the superior mix of technologies alone would make the matches for manufacturing workers in country i better than those for their counterparts in country j; if the same set of worker types happened to sort into manufacturing in the two countries. On the other hand, we have just seen that a wider range of workers sorts into manufacturing in country i than in country j, and since the marginal workers in the sector are better than the average, a worker of a given ability level …nds it more di¢ cult to match with a good …rm due to the greater competition in the labor market. The apparent ambiguity can be seen in Figure 6 ; depending on the distance between a Ri and a Rj , it appears that the inverse-matching curve for country i, which The ambiguity is only apparent, however. We …nd that the better matching that is associated with a superior technology set can never be fully (or more than fully) o¤set by the endogenous response of the composition of workers in the sector. 26 In other words, the inverse-matching function for country i must lie above the inverse-matching function for country j, even after the di¤erence between a Ri and a Rj has been taken into account. In the new equilibrium, all worker types a 2 (a min ; a Rj ] …nd better technology matches in country i than in country j. This generates strictly greater wage inequality among workers with abilities in this range. Figure 7 depicts (log) relative wages in the two countries, including workers employed in both the manufacturing and research sectors. For a > a Ri , the two curves have the same slopes, because wages of research workers rise at the same rate in both countries as a re ‡ection of their common research productivities. For a < a Rj , relative wages rise faster with ability in country i than in country j, because workers there achieve better technological matches than their counterparts and productivity in manufacturing is log supermodular in technology and ability. Finally, for a 2 (a Rj ; a Ri ), wages rise more rapidly with ability in country j than in country i, because these ability levels are allocated to R&D in j, but to manufacturing in i, and by Assumption 2, productivity is 2 6 Inasmuch as gMi < gMj, Now suppose it were the case that m '; aRj; ' j < m ('; aRi; ' i ) for all ' 2 ' min ; ' j . Then a; aRj; ' j = aRj; aRj; ' j < (a; aRi; ' i ) = (aRj; aRi; ' i ) for all a 2 (amin; aRj], which would imply that
The expression on the far right-hand side of this inequality chain is rising in aRj by Lemma 2, and thus it implies + gMi < K N (aRi; ' i ). But this contradicts condition (18) for country i. more responsive to ability in research than in manufacturing.
What then can we say about the comparison of income distributions in the two countries? Our analysis suggests that the wage distribution is strictly more unequal in the country with the better manufacturing technologies at the bottom end of the wage distribution, but that the opposite is true at the top end of the distribution. For the entire earnings structure, the two wage distributions cannot be unambiguously ranked. We collect our …ndings in With this interpretation, an increase in ' induces a growth slowdown together with an increase in the relative wages of middle-ability workers compared to those at either extreme.
Growth and Inequality in a Trading Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce international trade among a set of countries that di¤er in size, in research productivity, in manufacturing technologies, in capacity to create and absorb international knowledge spillovers, and in their innovation and trade policies. First, we examine the e¤ects of trade on growth and income inequality in a typical country. Then, we allow countries to di¤er along one dimension at a time and ask how each di¤erence is re ‡ected in the cross-country comparison of their income distributions. We also explore the spillover e¤ects of policies and parameters in one country on growth and income inequality in its trading partners.
Our trading environment has C countries indexed by c = 1; : : : ; C. In country c, there are N c workers with a distribution of abilities, H (a). 27 A worker with ability a who applies a technology ' in country c can produce c ('; a) units of any intermediate good, where ('; a) again has the complementarity properties described by Assumption 1 and c is, as before, a parameter that allows for Hicks-neutral productivity di¤erences in the manufacturing sector across countries. In the research sector, a worker with ability a has potential productivity T c T (a)K c , where T c re ‡ects the research productivity of workers of a given type in country c and K c is the national stock of knowledge capital, about which we will have more to say in a moment.
To ease the exposition, we will assume except in Section 4.5 that inventors in all countries draw manufacturing technologies from a common distribution G ('). Note, however, that Proposition 5 below that compares the growth rate and income inequality in a trade equilibrium to those in a country's autarky equilibrium would apply as well to a trading environment in which inventors worldwide face truncated Pareto distributions of possible technology outcomes with a common shape parameter, but with di¤erent bounds in each country.
We while the choice of numeraire allows us to set any one of these prices equal to one. We denote by X c the output of …nal goods in country c.
We describe now the di¤erences in national knowledge stocks and in countries'abilities to apply (2013) for a static analysis of the interplay between factor heterogeneity and sectoral factor intensities in shaping factor rewards. 2 8 Our results concerning the e¤ects of trade on growth and inequality and the spillover e¤ects of policy would also apply if the …nal good were freely traded. However, in such circumstances, the …nal good would only be produced in the country (or countries) with the minimum cost of producing these goods as determined by aggregating the domestic prices of the various domestic and imported intermediates. domestic and foreign knowledge depends on a country's institutions and in particular on its regime for protection of intellectual property rights and the quality of its tertiary education. To capture this reality, we assume that the stock of knowledge in country c is given by
where Kjc is a parameter that re ‡ects the extent to which cumulative research experience in country j contributes to inventors' productivity in country c. We assume that Kjc > 0 for all j and c, so that every country reaps some spillover bene…ts from research that takes place anywhere in the world. Note that Kcc measures the e¤ectiveness with which country c converts its own research experience into usable knowledge; this parameter is the same as what we denoted by K in Section 2.3 above. The special case of complete international spillovers into country c can be represented by setting Kjc = Kc for all j. If spillovers are complete and countries are symmetric in their abilities to absorb knowledge, then Kjc = K for all j and c.
The E¤ects of Trade on Growth and Inequality
To solve the open-economy model, we make use of a separability property of the dynamic equilibrium. First note that, along a balanced-growth path, the number of di¤erentiated varieties grows at the same rate in all countries; i.e., _ M c =M c g M c = g M for all c. In our one-sector model, this implies a convergence also in growth rates of per capita income. 29 The output of …nal goods, X, in the equations for the pro…ts of a typical intermediate good (8) We can solve for the growth rate of varieties in country c and the cuto¤ point for labor allocation a Rc using two equations analogous to (16) and (18) . In place of the former, we have
where c K c =M c is the ratio of the knowledge stock in country c to the country's own cumulative experience in research. In place of the latter (and taking into account the R&D subsidy), we have
and (a; a Rc ) is determined by an equation just like (17) . The solution to (20) and (21) autarky. This greater productivity translates a given labor input into greater innovation by (20) and it reduces the cost of R&D that is embedded in the zero-pro…t condition in (21) . Now we are ready to compare (20) and (21) to their analogs that describe the closed-economy equilibrium (with R&D subsidies). Note that the bigger c appears in place of the smaller Kcc (i.e., K ) in each equation. Thus, the RR curve for the open economy lies proportionately above that for the closed economy, whereas the AA curve for the open economy lies more than proportionately above that for the closed economy. The two curves that determine the open-economy equilibrium in country c cross above and to the left of the intersection depicted in Figure 4 . Thus, in a trade equilibrium, every country devotes more labor to research than in autarky and it invents new varieties at a greater rate. The expansion of the research sector (fall in a Rc ) generates an increase in wage inequality, both as a re ‡ection of the re-matching of the given mix of technologies with a smaller and less able set of manufacturing workers and of the greater number of workers in research, where ability is more amply rewarded. Meanwhile, the acceleration of innovation generates faster growth of wages and …nal output. We have established Proposition 5 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable. Countries may di¤ er in their manufacturing productivities, their research productivities, their labor supplies, their R&D subsidies, and their import tari¤ s. In a balanced-growth equilibrium, every country grows faster with trade than in autarky and every country has everywhere a more unequal income distribution with trade than in autarky.
Di¤erences in Manufacturing Productivity and Trade Barriers
Suppose now that countries di¤er only in their manufacturing productivities, as parameterized by c , and in their trade barriers, as re ‡ected in jc . For the moment, we assume they are equal in size (N c = N for all c), equal in research productivity ( T c = T for all c), have similar R&D subsidies (s c = s for all c) and bene…t symmetrically from complete international knowledge spillovers ( Kjc = K for all j and c). In these circumstances, a balanced-growth path with g M c = g M requires c = and a Rc = a R for all c, per equations (20) and (21) . It follows that not only do the long-run growth rates converge internationally, but so too do the sizes and compositions of the research sectors. Then, matching between technologies and worker types is the same in all countries, and (17) applies worldwide with the same value of a R . As a result, the relative-wage structure in the manufacturing sector is the same in all countries. So too is the wage pro…le in R&D, by Lemma 2. In short, the same wage pro…le emerges in all countries, up to a factor of proportionality. The di¤erences in manufacturing productivity and import tari¤ rates generate cross-country heterogeneity only in wage levels. We summarize in It is also clear that, in these circumstances, the long-run value of is independent of any c and jc , in which case (20) and (21) imply that changes in manufacturing productivities or in trade frictions do not a¤ect the long-run growth rate or relative wages in any country. 30 Moreover, c would be independent of c and jc (albeit not necessarily common across countries) if countries were of di¤erent sizes, had di¤erent R&D subsidies, had di¤erent research productivities, or had di¤erent capacities to generate or absorb international R&D spillovers. The parameters c and jc do, of course, a¤ect income levels and consumer welfare.
Di¤erences in Innovation Capacity and in Ability to Create and Absorb Knowledge Spillovers
Now suppose that all countries have equal R&D subsidy rates (s c = s for all c). They may di¤er in size (N c ) and in research productivity ( T c ). Moreover, there may be di¤erences in their abilities to absorb R&D spillovers from abroad and in their abilities to convert research experience (their own and foreign) into usable knowledge that facilitates subsequent innovation. Such di¤erences are re ‡ected in the arbitrary matrix K = f Kjc g of spillover parameters that determines knowledge 3 0 With Kjc = K for all j and c, (19) yields Kc = K P C j=1 Mj for all c, and thus c = K P C j=1 Mj =Mc for all c. Then (20) and the fact established above that aRc = aR for all c imply that c = = K C. Clearly, is independent of any c or jc. capital in country c, according to (19) . Finally, as in Section 4.2, they may face or impose di¤erent trade barriers jc and operate with di¤erent manufacturing productivities, c . In all of these cases, (20) and (21) imply
It is clear from (22) that, since all countries converge on the same long-run growth rate of varieties, they must also have the same ability cuto¤ level a Rc = a R . Then, all share a common longrun wage pro…le. It is interesting to note that international integration generates a convergence in income inequality around the globe, whereas di¤erences in innovation capacity give rise to di¤erent degrees of inequality in autarky.
Although relative wages are the same in all countries, wage levels are not equalized internationally. We show in Kj T j . The greater is the product of a country's research productivity and its e¢ ciency in generating knowledge capital from global research experience, the greater is the level of its wages. If trade is not free, a country's size can also a¤ect the level of its wages due to a home-market e¤ect that expands market access for its producers.
Next observe that with a Rc = a R for all c, (20) We recognize as being a characteristic root of the matrix = f jc g, with associated characteristic vector = f c g. Moreover, by the assumption that Kjc > 0 for all j and c, all elements of are strictly positive. Then the Perron-Frobenius Theorem implies that all elements of can be positive (as they must be) only if is the largest characteristic root of . Finally, the envelope theorem implies that must be increasing in every element jc of . 31 We have thus established that an increase in any spillover parameter Kjc , in any country size N c or in any R&D productivity parameter T c , shifts upward the RR curve and the AA curve for every country, and the former by more (at the initial a R ) than the latter. The result is an increase in the common rate of long-run growth and an increase in income inequality in every country. 
The largest characteristic root is found by maximizing the right hand side with respect to f c g. By the envelope theorem, the largest is an increasing function of every jc .
We record our …ndings in 
Di¤erences in R&D Subsidies
Suppose that international knowledge spillovers are complete and that countries are similar in all ways except in their R&D subsidies and in the proportional wage taxes used to …nance these subsidies. 32 It is clear from (20) that, with N c = N and T c = T for all c; convergence to a common long-run growth rate requires
.
That is, the ratio of the knowledge stock in country c to that country's own cumulative experience in research mirrors the ratio of aggregate world allocation of labor to R&D (adjusted for productivity)
relative to the country's own allocation of labor to R&D (adjusted for productivity). Under these circumstances, the long-run zero-pro…t conditions (21) vary across countries and therefore so too do the equilibrium cuto¤ levels.
Let us compare two countries i and j such that s i > s j ; i.e., country i supports research activities more generously than does country j. Substituting the expressions for i and j into (21), we …nd
The right-hand side of this expression is increasing in a Ri and decreasing in a Rj , so s i > s j implies a Ri < a Rj ; i.e., the research sector is larger as a fraction of the labor force in the country that promotes R&D more aggressively. This does not generate faster long-run growth in i than in j, but it does spell a more unequal long-run income distribution there.
Although wage pro…les do not converge in the presence of (di¤erential) R&D subsidies, such policies do a¤ect growth and inequality throughout the world. To examine these spillover e¤ects of innovation policy, we treat (20) and (21) as a system of C +1 equations that determines the C cuto¤ ability levels and the common growth rate, g M . We prove in Appendix A4.4 that an increase in an arbitrary subsidy rate s i leads to an expansion of the research sectors in all countries. 33 In other 3 2 It is relatively easy to verify that the implications of di¤erences in research support would be the same as we describe here, even if we allowed for cross-country di¤erences in innovation capacity and in tari¤ rates. However, we assume that these features are common in order to simplify the exposition. 3 3 The proof involves substituting (20) into the C equations that comprise (21) and then totally log di¤erentiating words, da Rj =ds i < 0 for all i; j 2 f1; : : : ; Cg. It follows that an increase in a single subsidy rate contributes not only to faster innovation throughout the world economy, but also to a spreading of the long-run wage distribution everywhere. We summarize in Proposition 8 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable, that international knowledge spillovers are complete, and that countries di¤ er only in their R&D subsidy rates. Comparing any two countries, the long-run wage distribution is everywhere more unequal in the one with the greater subsidy
rate. An increase in any subsidy rate raises the common long-run growth rate and generates a spread in the distribution of wages in every country.
Di¤erences in Technology Sets
Our last comparison involves countries whose innovators draw from di¤erent technology sets. As in Section 3.4, we take G c (') to be a truncated Pareto distribution with shape parameter k > 2 (common to all countries) and with a range in country c given by [' min ; ' c ]. In (21), we now write (a Rc ; ' c ), to emphasize the fact that the upper limit of the technology distribution a¤ects the matching between workers and technologies and thus the relative wage pro…le, (a; a Rc ; ' c ). Note, however, that if two countries share the same ability cuto¤ and the same maximum technology level, they will have the same matching and wage pro…les in manufacturing; i.e., ( ) and ( ) take the same forms in all countries, given ' c . into (21) , and using the assumption that R&D subsidies are common across all countries, we see that the cuto¤ ability levels cannot be the same in countries where innovators draw from di¤erent productivity sets. In fact, c (a Rc ; ' c ) is increasing in a Rc but decreasing in ' c , so a country that draws from a better set of production technologies has a larger value of a Rc , thus a larger manufacturing sector and a smaller R&D sector. All countries grow at the same rate along the balanced growth-path, as growth is driven by the accumulation of global knowledge capital.
the result with respect to the vector of net-of-subsidy elements f1 scg and …nding the matrix As that pre-multiplies the vector fdaRc=aRcg in the resulting system. We show that As has positive diagonal elements and negative o¤diagonal elements and that there exists a diagonal matrix Ds such that AsDs is diagonally dominant of its rows (i.e., the row sum is positive for each row). This implies that As is an M-matrix (Johnson, 1982) and therefore the inverse matrix A 1 s has only positive elements.
In the long run, income inequality di¤ers systematically across countries. On the one hand, a better set of technologies implies better matching opportunities for workers in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, the induced change in the composition of workers in manufacturing intensi…es the competition for the good technologies. But by arguments similar to those used to prove Proposition 4, it turns out that the former force must dominate. If ' i > ' j , then a Ri > a Rj and so a manufacturing worker of given ability in country i …nds a better technology match than his counterpart of similar ability in country j. Consequently, manufacturing wages are less equally distributed in country i than in country j. However, the manufacturing sector is larger in country i than in country j, so a smaller set of workers enjoy the higher returns to ability that research work a¤ords. Overall, inequality in country i is greater than that in country j for individuals with ability a < a Rj , but inequality is at least as great in country j as in country i for individuals with a > a Rj . Finally, as in autarky, there are workers in the middle of the ability distribution in country i who earn more relative to both the most able and least able of their countryman than do their counterparts of similar ability in country j. We record Proposition 9 Suppose that intermediate goods are tradable, that international knowledge spillovers are complete, and that countries di¤ er only in the technology sets from which their inventors draw.
If G c (') is a truncated Pareto distribution with shape parameter k > 2 and with a range in country c given by [' min ; ' c ] and if ' i > ' j , then inequality in country i is greater than that in country j for workers with ability a < a Rj , but inequality is at least as great in country j as in country i for workers with ability a > a Rj . There exists a range of abilities A = [a ; a ] such that for a 2 A, w i (a) =w i (a min ) > w j (a) =w j (a min ) and w i (a) =w i (a max ) > w j (a) =w j (a max ).
The main lessons from this section are threefold. First, international integration a¤ords researchers access to a larger knowledge stock, which raises research productivity worldwide and leads to an acceleration of innovation and growth. At the same time, the expansion of each country's idea-generating sector spells a ubiquitous increase in wage inequality. Second, national conditions that create di¤erential incentives for research versus manufacturing generate long-run di¤erences in wage distributions, whereas conditions that a¤ect a country's ability to contribute to or draw on the world's stock of knowledge capital lead to a convergence in wage distributions but with crosscountry di¤erences in wage levels. Finally, technological conditions or government policies that cause an expansion of the research sector in one country typically have spillover e¤ects abroad. In particular, when the incentives for R&D rise somewhere, the induced expansion in knowledge capital generates a positive growth spillover for other countries and a tendency for income inequality to rise everywhere.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied in depth one mechanism that links long-run growth and income distribution. The mechanism operates via sorting and matching in the labor market. We posit that the most able individuals in any economy specialize in creating ideas and that innovation is the engine of growth. Among those that use ideas rather than create them, a complementarity between ability and technology dictates matching between the more able individuals and the more sophisticated and productive technologies. In the long run, the size of what we call the research sector determines not only the pace of innovation, but also the composition of the manufacturing sector and therefore the matching between workers and technologies that results.
We have explored this mechanism in a very simple economic environment. We have abstracted from diversity in manufacturing industries, from team production activities that involve multiple individuals in both research and manufacturing, from capital inputs that may be complementary to certain worker or inventor types, and from a host of market frictions that can impede job placement and …nancing for innovation. Nonetheless, we have been able to shed light on a rich set of interactions between growth and inequality. Typically, but not ubiquitously, faster growth goes hand in hand with greater inequality; a larger research sector spells higher returns for the most able individuals in the economy as well as better technological matches for workers in the (smaller) manufacturing sector, which tends to favor especially those manufacturing workers that are more able and better paid. We have identi…ed technological and policy features of the economy that a¤ect long-run inequality and others that a¤ect only levels of income but not relative compensation.
By allowing for international trade and international knowledge spillovers, we introduced links between inequality measures in di¤erent countries. Generally, we …nd that within-country income inequality is exacerbated by globalization. The mechanism is not the usual one, however, i.e., that trade leads to specialization in sectors that di¤er in factor intensity, but rather that international knowledge sharing makes innovation more productive and so creates incentives for expansion of the idea-generating portion of the economy worldwide. As the research sector expands in every country so too does the relative pay for the most able individuals (who engage in innovation) as well as for the more able workers that sort to manufacturing. As a rule, the more able workers in manufacturing bene…t relatively more from the improved matching with technologies. Our treatment of the open economy also allows us to study the links between conditions and policies in one country and growth and distributional outcomes in its trade partners. For example, we …nd that an R&D subsidy in one country accelerates growth in all countries and increases within-country income inequality throughout the globe. While previous work on endogenous growth emphasized crosscountry dependence in growth rates (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991), our model also features cross-country dependence in wage inequality. Moreover, while long-run growth rates converge, cross-country di¤erences in wage inequality can persist even along a balanced-growth path.
Numerous possible extensions of our model come to mind. Additional elements of interdependence would arise if production functions involved multiple factors of production (or teams of individuals) and if sectors di¤ered in their relative factor intensities. We also suspect that investment in ideas has more dimensions of uncertainty than just the productivity of the resulting technology, and that the prospects for success in innovation and the range of reachable technologies depend on the abilities of the individuals who generate the new ideas. Imperfect information about worker characteristics and frictions in labor markets undoubtedly impede the smooth, assortative matching that features in our model. Similarly, asymmetric information about research ideas and …nancing constraints impede investment in innovation and bias technological outcomes. All of these extensions would be interesting.
We view our contribution in this paper not as a …nal word on the link between growth and inequality, but as an exploration of a core mechanism that will play a role in richer economic environments. The empirical importance of this mechanism remains to be settled, although at this stage it is not obvious how to do so in light of the limited availability of historical data and the endogeneity of the variables of interest.
A4.3 Cross-Country Wage Levels with Di¤erences in Innovation Capacity
Here we consider the cross-country di¤erences in wage levels that result from asymmetries in innovation capacity. We assume equal R&D subsidy rates and complete international knowledge spillovers; i.e., s j = s and Kjc = Kc for all j. Note that this allows for international di¤erences in capacities to convert knowledge capital into new varieties, as captured by Kc . We also allow for di¤erences in country size, N c , and for di¤erences in research productivity, T c .
We have seen in Section 4.3 that, with di¤erences in innovation capacity, the cuto¤ ability levels a Rc are the same in all countries, and so therefore are the distributions of wages. We represent the wage schedule in country c by w c (a) = ! c w (a) and refer to ! c as the wage level in country c.
Substituting the expression for pro…ts analogous to (8) that applies to the open economy into the freeentry condition analogous to (10) that does likewise, and taking the ratio of the resulting equations that hold for two countries i and j, we …nd
If intermediate goods are freely trade ( jc = 1 for all j and c), then X c = X = P C j=1 X j ; i.e., market access is the same in all countries. Under these circumstances, (26) implies that the relative wage levels in any pair of countries i and j varies monotonically with ( Ki T i ) = ( Kj T j ) and does not depend on their relative size, N i =N j . If, on the other hand, there exist barriers to trade, then market access will not be the same in all countries. With equal trade barriers jc = > 1 for j 6 = c, a home-market e¤ect would generate a greater market access for larger countries and therefore higher wages.
A4.4 Spillover E¤ects of National R&D Subsidies
In this appendix, we examine the e¤ects of changing an R&D subsidy in one country on growth and inequality in that country and in all trading partners.
As in Section 4.4, we suppose that international knowledge spillovers are complete and that countries are similar in all ways except in their R&D subsidies and in the proportional wage taxes used to …nance these subsidies. Under these circumstances, (20 We note that the matrix A s has positive diagonal elements and negative o¤-diagonal elements. In particular, in row j, the diagonal element is " j + 1 j " Rj , where " j > 0 is the elasticity of ( ) evaluated at a Rj , " Rj > 0 is minus the elasticity of R amax a R T (a) dH (a) with respect to a R evaluated at a Rj , and j = "
For j 6 = c, the o¤-diagonal element in column j is j " Rj < 0. Inasmuch as A s has only negative o¤-diagonal elements, we recognize that it is a Z-matrix. Moreover, there exists a diagonal matrix D s such that A s D s is diagonally dominant in its rows. To see this, consider the diagonal matrix D s that has a diagonal entry in row j given by 1=" Rj . Then the diagonal element in row c and column c of A s D s is given by " c =" Rc + (1 c ) and the o¤-diagonal element in row c and column j is given by j . Summing the entries in any row c gives " c =" Rc + 1 P C j=1 j > 0, where the inequality follows from the fact that P C j=1 j < 1. Having established that A s is a Z-matrix and there exists a diagonal matrix D s such that A s D s is diagonally dominant in its rows, it follows that A s is an M -matrix (see Johnson, 1982) . Then its inverse, A 1 s , has only positive elements. We conclude that an increase in any subsidy rate (i.e., a reduction in any 1 s c ) reduces every cuto¤ point a Rj , j = 1; : : : ; C. Since more individuals are hired as researchers in every country, every country grows faster and experiences greater income inequality.
